The month of May, in the year 1999, was witness to a bloody battle on the issue of Kashmir. Pakistan, in a calculated move, sought to alter the alignment of the Line of Control (LoC) by sending in its troops along with foreign mercenaries. What made this particular act so distinct was the fact that never before had incursions been in such large number and so deep into our territory.

Modern wars are no longer fought on a single service wicket, a fact that was put to fore in this battle. While the Army and the Air Force readied themselves for the battle on the heights of Kargil, Indian Navy began to draw out its plans to send a defiant message down to the corridors of power in Pakistan. Unlike the earlier wars with Pakistan, this time the bringing in of the Navy at the early stages of the conflict served to hasten the end of the conflict in India's favour.

In drawing up its strategy, the Navy was clear that a reply to the Pakistani misadventure had to be two-pronged. Whilst ensuring safety and security of our maritime assets from a possible surprise attack by Pakistan, it was imperative that all efforts must be made to deter Pakistan from escalating the conflict into a full scale war. Thus, the Indian Navy was put on a full alert from May 20 onwards, a few days prior to the launch of the Indian retaliatory offensive. Naval and Coast Guard aircraft were put on a continuous surveillance and the units readied up for meeting any challenge at sea.

Time had now come to put pressure on Pakistan, to ensure that the right message went down to the masterminds in that country. Strike elements from the Eastern Fleet were sailed from Visakhapatnam on the East Coast to take part in a major naval exercise called 'SUMMEREX' in the North Arabian Sea. This was envisaged as the largest ever amassing of naval ships in the region. The message had been driven home. Pakistan Navy, in a defensive mood, directed all its units to keep clear of Indian naval ships. As the exercise shifted closer to the Makaran Coast, Pakistan moved all its major combatants out of Karachi. It also shifted its focus to escorting its oil trade from the Gulf in anticipation of attacks by Indian ships.

As the retaliation from the Indian Army and the Air Force gathered momentum and a defeat to Pakistan seemed a close possibility, an outbreak of hostilities became imminent. Thus the naval focus now shifted to the Gulf of Oman. Rapid reaction missile carrying units and ships from the fleet were deployed in the North Arabian Sea for carrying out missile firing, anti-submarine and electronic warfare exercises. In the absence of the only aircraft carrier, Sea Harrier operations from merchant ships were proven. The Navy also readied itself for implementing a blockade of the Pakistani ports, should the need arise. In addition, Naval amphibious forces from the Andaman group of islands were moved to the western sea-board.

All this had served its purpose in its entirety. Pakistan Army leadership was increasingly getting isolated and the need for such an incursion by Pakistan into Kargil became a question of debate in the upper echelons of the Pakistani society. This put tremendous pressure on the Pakistani Premier who rushed to USA to meet President Clinton. The rest is history.

Dras, Mushkoh Valley, Tiger Hills, Batalik- the scene was as if out of Dante's Inferno. War correspondents yelled into microphones with the backdrop of huge guns belching forth fire and destruction shaking the Earth of its very core. They were softening up the enemy; neutralising it, before the infantry started to attack and occupy the position. The sound of these guns, the guns of Kargil, had started echoing and reverberating around the world.

In earlier times, artillery was used to give covering fire. It was used to provide an umbrella for the infantry so that the enemy was not able to hit them, as they attacked, since he was pinned down. Not so any longer. The Indian field gun, 120 mm mortar, 160mm mortar, 130mm medium and the 155mm Bofors were the mainstay of Indian attacks in Kargil. The accuracy, attack and destructive power of these guns was such that they were used to neutralise and pulverise the enemy before an infantry attack. They prepared the ground for the attack by the foot soldier.

Most attacks, nowdays, are carried out at night. The 'star' ammunition was used by these guns to provide illumination to spot targets. Again, high explosives were combined with incendiaries in these guns leading to burning and blinding of the enemy. Another kind of ammunition, known as the richochet ammunition, was used by these guns to destroy bunkers. This was aimed a little short of the target. It hit the ground, bounced or richocheted upwards and bursted at eight feet destroying the bunker aimed at, completely. Infact, shells weighing as much as 50 kg were fired which, when bursted, splintered into 72 pieces, each being capable of penetrating a bunker roof. The fire being spat out by these guns put the fear of the devil into the enemy. Intercepts had caught them screaming in panic-stricken voice : aag aa rahi hai hamare uppar (fire is coming on top of us).

Operation Safed Sagar, as the Air Force operations in the Kargil area were called, was indeed a milestone in the annals of military aviation as this was the first time that air power was employed on such a scale in a mountainous and hostile terrain at forbidding altitudes.

After the IAF was first requested on May 11, 1999 to carry out counter- surface force operations with armed helicopters against armed intruders, the Air Force went into immediate preparations for hostilities. The Air Force also commenced a large scale airlift of troops, ammunition and stores into the sector as the presence on ground had traditionally been thinned out during winters. The IAF also commenced aerial reconnaissance-and-strike familiarisation. The rapid mobilisation ensured that IAF was ready for undertaking wide ranging full scale military operations by the morning of May 15. However,the nation needed some time to fully assess the magnitude of threat. The Air Chief as well as the COSC, having fully assessed the situation, formally asked the government on May 25 to permit the IAF to go into operations as it was now evident that the situation was serious enough to warrant intervention by the Air Force. The permission was promptly given with the caveat that the Air Force was not to cross the LoC.

From May 11 to May 25, ground troops supported by the Air Force tried to contain the threat, assessed the enemy dispositions and carried out various preparatory actions. Entry of the Air Force into combat action on May 26 represented a paradigm shift in the nature and prognosis of the conflict. There were no longer any doubts about whether the intruders would be evicted in an acceptable time frame or about the eventual outcome of the operation. It was only a matter of time spanning over a few weeks that the rout of the intruders would be truly complete. Diaries of Pakistani soldiers recovered after the operation bore ample testimony to the severe damage and demoralistation caused by India’s air attacks over the Pakistani intruders.

The Air Force went about its business in a totally professional, systematic and integrated operation with the Army. Every single place attacked by the Army was preceded by a "friendly" visit by the IAF strike aircraft. It is perhaps not very well known that while undertaking operation Safed Sagar, the Air Force actually used only a small fraction of its power. The air operations were synchronised with those of the Army and were paced accordingly. The Air Force was also ready to engage in a full scale war, had the enemy chosen to escalate the hostilities by introducing his Air Force into the fray. While carrying out the attack operations, the IAF also maintained a powerful presence in the air with its air superiority fighters, carried out reconnaissance of the entire area to locate enemy camps and supplied dumps and tracks. This collation of data and analysis took a little while as the exact disposition of the enemy was not clear. The air logistics flights and casualty evacution tasks also continued. Reconnaissance paid rich dividends when the Air Force decimated the supply camps, important key heights held by the enemy such as Tiger Hill and attacked enemy’s logistics columns and bases. Indeed, destruction of the logistics camps rendered the enemy hungry, cold and short of ammunition. The effectiveness of air attacks can be judged by the fact that the enemy lost a large number of personnel in a defensive operation. It is usually the attacker, especially in such terrain where the heights are held by the enemy, who suffers greater casualties. Eventually, fearing total rout and annihilation, the enemy sued for ceasefire and withdrawal. It was evident that a macho mindset was no substitute for a quiet and mature professional analysis and planning.

In operation Safed Sagar, the Air Force carried out nearly 5000 sorties of all types over 50-odd days of operations. Operations in this terrain required special training and tactics. It was soon realised that greater skills and training were needed to attack the very small/miniature targets extant, often not visible to the naked eye. The shoulder-fired missile threat was omnipresent and there were no doubts about this. An IAF Canberra recce aircraft was damaged by a Pakistani Stinger fired possibly from across the LoC. On the second and third day of the operations, still in the learning curve, the IAF lost one MiG-21 fighter and one Mi-17 helicopter to shoulder-fired missiles by the enemy. In addition, one MiG-27 was lost on the second day due to engine failure just after the pilot had carried out successful attacks on one of the enemy's main supply dumps. These events only went to reinforce the tactics of the IAF in carrying out attacks from outside the Stinger SAM envelope and avoiding the use of helicopters for attack purposes. Attack helicopters have a certain utility in operations under relatively benign conditions but are extremely vulnerable in an intense battlefield. The fact that the enemy fired more than 100 shoulder fired SAMs against IAF aircraft indicates not only the great intensity of the enemy air defences in the area but also the success of IAF tactics, especially after the first three days of the war during which not a single aircraft received even a scratch.

As time went by, reconnaissance data accumulated and the tempo of ground operations picked up. The Air Force was able to adopt large scale attacks by day and night resulting in much of the enemy force not getting any sleep. With food, fuel and ammunition stocks destroyed or degraded and a sleepless and fatigued force, little wonder that the armed intruders chose discretion as the better part of valour. Far from being an off-the-cuff quick reaction affair, each air strike was the end result of a carefully planned chain of events spanning several areas of specialisation. The importance of aerial recce was again underscored during the operation. In Safed Sagar, all national resources were used in constructing the bigger picture.

The most telling effects on the ground became evident in the intercepts of enemy radio revealing severe shortage of ration, water, medicines and ammunition. Losses due to air strikes and inability to evacuate their casualties were also mentioned in the intercepts. A message received from one of the HQs of the Indian Army read : "You guys have done a wonderful job. Your Mirage boys with their precision laser guided bombs targeted an enemy Battalion HQ in Tiger Hill area with tremendous success. Five Pakistani officers reported killed in that attack and their command and control broke down as a result of which our troops have literally walked over the entire Tiger Hills area. The enemy is on the run. They are on the run in other sectors also. At this rate, the end of the conflict may come soon ."

In the final analysis, an effective application of air power saved the day for India and helped in an early end to operation. In this context, the basic functions and impact of air power only got re-emphasised. During IAF’s operations in 1947-48, Tempests carried out strafing and rocket attacks on the intruders and Dakotas ferried in and para dropped troops and supplies. Then and now, whenever called upon by the nation, the IAF together with the Army and the Navy has played an equal role in the defence of the country.

The immense experience gained from the operation Safed Sagar would stand in good stead in future. The lessons would be applicable to all the air forces for it was the first time in the history of military aviation that such an air operation took place in such an environment. While conventional, long-accepted air power theories still hold good, a new set of operating paradigms had to be evolved almost overnight to cope with the situation.

This was the first time that the IAF fought a limited war, hitherto thought to be an unlikely eventuality. In the future, the possibility of rapid escalation would need to be reckoned with. The deterrent effect of air power has been underscored. To derive full effectiveness, the Air Force has to be able to operate in an unrestrained manner interdicting the enemy forces, supplies and logistics at their very origin. This altruism would need to be taken note of. The nation would also need to comprehend the dominant role and dynamics of air power in the service of nation, both as a peace time deterrent as well as the brahmastra, the final arbiter in war.