It was operation Desert Storm in 1991 that really changed the ways of viewing the role of air-power. This campaign demonstrated, as never before, that conventional air operations could not only support a ground scheme of manoeuvre, but also largely achieve operational and strategic-level objectives, at times, independent of ground forces. Air power’s inherent characteristics of speed, range, mobility and flexibility began to be globally recognised as powerful instruments in warfare.

The Gulf War of 1991 also demonstrated the importance of high technology. Iraq’s weapon system did not fall into the category of low technology systems. Yet, the Iraqis were swamped by the Allied forces’ sound air-power strategy that relied on well-applied, technology-savvy assets. Technological surprise rather than tactical surprise will increasingly provide the key to achieving asymmetry in military capabilities and desired results.

The disintegration of Yugoslavia began in 1991. The world’s attention soon focused on Bosnia where bitter fighting was going on between the Serbs and Bosnian Muslims. Finally in August 1995, an air campaign termed ‘Deliberate Force’ began. By the end of the campaign, Serbian civilian casualties were estimated as less than thirty. In the process, the Allies lost only one aircraft. The air campaign during this operation was the crucial step that brought the warring parties to negotiating table at Dayton leading to the peace agreement.

Events prompting war reached a peak by March 1999 in Kosovo. By then it was estimated that 2,50,000 Kosovans were driven out of their homes. NATO’s negotiations to end the violence, followed by threats to use force, proved fruitless. NATO assumed that it could replicate the quick and successful bombing campaign that saved Bosnia. It, therefore, began a tepid air campaign on March 24, 1999 that slowly accelerated. NATO finally achieved its goals after continued bombing for seventy-eight days. This war for Kosovo costed 3 billion US dollars, and only 500 non-combatants were killed as a result of bombing error.

The air operation proved that air-power has made rapid strides in the relative importance of the different elements that may be used in war. For the first time, air-power, by itself, was responsible to achieve the objectives of the conflict and force the enemy to yield. Although this is true, it is not here suggested that air-power, can always win wars by itself but only that its increasing capability and effectiveness make it a dominant factor in the calculus of war. Air-power is an offensive weapon; defensive warfare is doomed to fail. Air-power has capabilities and potential to "find, fix, track, engage and destroy anything on earth".

Operation Enduring Freedom was launched by USA against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda forces in Afghanistan as an aftermath of September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on the WTC. It was basically an air power centred operation, which destroyed the Taliban and Al-Qaeda forces, demolishing the whole structure of Taliban power.

Air power in Afghanistan, however, warrants a note of caution. No two wars are alike and not all lessons learnt can be applicable elsewhere, more so when this conflict was conceived and fought as a non-conventional radically asymmetric war in the context of the global engagement against terrorism.

The US established total air superiority within days because a mission for suppression of enemy air defences (SEAD) had neutralised whatever little was there of the Taliban’s limited air defence assets and disrupted its command and control over infrastructure as well as reserves. Complete control of Afghan skies provided the Americans the freedom to operate a range of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms.

During the Afghan campaign, the American forces were able to effectively integrate diverse high and low technology systems and innovative tactics into a overall capability to achieve battlefield dominance. It was not technology alone but the organisational and training procedures that clearly worked in tandem. The widely media-splashed examples of Special Operations Forces (SOF) soldiers and Forward Air Controllers (FACs) on horseback using satellite phones and Global Positioning System (GPS) receivers to precisely target long-range bombers against Taliban, Al-Qaeda troops was indeed as innovative as it was unprecedented. Close coordination between air and ground also is nothing new and has been a subject of military training since 1950s. But, what is dramatically different is rather than air strikes supporting the efforts of a sizeable manoeuvre force, it was the ground forces that supported air operations by revealing the location of enemy or forcing it into the open.

The doctrine is based on study of military history, principles of war, combat leadership and application of air power. Those who possess a definite doctrine and have deep-rooted convictions based on it, will be in much better position to deal with the shifts and surprises, than those who merely take short views and indulge in natural impulses.

Since the ultimate purpose of war is to compel a result, the use of force to ‘control’ rather than ‘destroy’ an opponent’s ability to act, gives a different perspective as to the most effective use of force. Today, stealth and precision have enabled ‘control’ over an opponent’s systems, rather than resorting to mass destruction to achieve military objectives.