The past century witnessed a profound impact of technology on the field of military capabilities. The advent of air power has in fact revolutionised the concept of war fighting. Today, its usage has transcended into aerospace capability. The early air power visionaries like Douhet and Mitchell had allowed their concepts to race ahead of technology. The Indian Air Force rewrote its operational doctrine when it launched operation Safed Sagar in support of the Army’s counter-infiltration operations in the high-altitude Dras and Kargil Sectors.

Safed Sagar was undertaken with the intention of achieving the national objective of throwing out the Pakistani regular forces and other armed intruders. MiG-21, MiG-23, MiG-27, MiG-29, Jaguar, Mirage-2000, Mi-8, Mi-17, Avro, An-32 and IL-76 aircraft took part in the operation. The combat aircraft took part in areas contiguous to Pakistan across the LoC. This was the first time that air power was used in internal security operations. Air operations shortened the time-frame within which the national objective was achieved. The might that was brought to bear on the enemy from the air, put the intruders in such disarray that they had no option but to negotiate a hurried departure. The IAF not only hastened the withdrawal of the enemy but was also instrumental in limiting its own casualties.

Kargil indeed was the arena where air power’s main characteristic of flexibility was fully exploited. Since air power is extremely visible and has the inherent potential for escalation into an all-out war, IAF had to be ready for such an eventuality. Preparations were made for all contingencies and all combat units were placed at full readiness in the shortest possible time.

The IAF was first approached to provide air support on May 11, 1999 with the use of helicopters. This was followed by a ‘go ahead’ given on May 25 by the Cabinet Committee on Security to the IAF to mount attacks on the infiltrators without crossing the LoC. While there was considerable pressure to operate only attack helicopters, the Air Chief succeeded in convincing the government that in order to create a suitable environment for the helicopters, fighter action was required. Operation Safed Sagar was, indeed, a milestone in the history of military aviation, as this was the first time that air-power was employed in such an environment.

Since the intention was only to drive away the intruders and not to escalate the conflict, a political restraint was issued- "Not to cross the LoC". Lucrative targets were available only on the other side of the LoC which was an area that the Air Force scrupulously avoided, as per the mandate given by the government. Such targets simply do not lend themselves to many types of armament and weapon delivery systems on the inventory of any Air Force. The IAF, therefore, selected targets with the intention of inflicting as much damage on personnel and weapons as on supplies. Such relentless attacks effectively reduced the enemy’s will and capacity to fight. The attacks were followed up by Army assaults to clear the area. The targets were widely dispersed and in several pockets all over the region. They were very mobile and this necessitated practically individual attacks. Stores, once located, were effectively engaged but the effects of the enemy’s losses, obviously, were felt only over a period of time.

It was for the first time that an Air Force was called upon to deliver its arsenal at such unprecedented heights, on targets, which were small and difficult to acquire. Space restriction and weather further complicated the matters. Yet, at no stage was our Army delayed from mounting an attack on any of the objectives. Close co-operation between the two Services ensured that our Army did not take on any particular objective unless it had been first visited by the Air Force.