India is an important maritime state. We see this from our geography, our history, our ancient seafaring and shipbuilding traditions and our commercial and trade ties. Yet, at the same time, there appears to be a lack of a basic appreciation of the security aspects of maritime interactions and enterprise over the years.

The lengthy mainland Indian peninsula, surrounded by the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal, thrusts deep into the Indian Ocean. Our island territories are spread far and wide and some are far closer to other countries than to the Indian mainland. In fact, countries like Indonesia and Thailand, with which we share maritime boundaries, are our "immediate" neighbours. In accordance with the International Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III, 1982), the peninsula and island territories provide us with a vast and expanding "maritime space".

Geographically, India lies astride the major Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOC) in the Indian Ocean-providing it with considerable strategic importance and potential. The vast proportion of our foreign trade - 97% in volume and 76% in value terms - is sea-borne. It is interesting to recall that in 1951, the first British Chief of post - Independent India’s Navy, Vice Admiral Edward Parry, has stated that India is "an island in that she is nearly inaccessible across her land frontiers". Over centuries, maritime interactions have influenced the course and direction of India’s destiny and prosperity.

The "father" of Indian maritime history, K M Panikkar, writes that from the earliest times till at least the arrival of the Portuguese in the early 16th century, Indian interests were preponderant in the Indian Ocean. Indian ships for most of the time, that is, till the beginning of the 14th century, had the lion’s share of traffic while the Arabs and Chinese freely participated in the trade. The South-East Asian empire of the Sri Vijayas is but one episode in the long history of India’s links with South-East Asia which are civilisational comprising centuries-old cultural, religious, commercial and linguistic ties.

Nonetheless, there remained insufficient appreciation of our maritime security. Scholars ascribe this to a number of reasons. Firstly, the absence of any requirement to build and maintain a strong naval force in view of the trade-dominated interactions within the Indian Ocean. After the great Chola dynasty, which had a fleet largely for the protection of trade, the Marathas were the first to consciously possess, and employ, a naval force. Secondly, coastal dynasties, such as that of the Zamorin (King) of Calicut, had a preponderance of small fast boats but lacked large vessels for operations at some distance from the coast. Thirdly, the inability to keep pace with evolving naval technologies of warfare in relation to western navies.

Panikkar begins his classic study, India and the Indian Ocean : An Essay on the Influence of Sea power on History, with the declaration of Khaireddin Barbarosa to Sultan Suleiman the Magnificient in the early 16th century : "He who rules on the sea will shortly rule on the land also". He further goes on to say that India’s history illustrated this principle better than that of any other country. As a matter of fact, India never lost her independence till she lost the command of the sea to the Portuguese in the first decade of the 16th century. This took place as a result of the crucial battle off Diu (1509) between the naval forces of the Portuguese and the Zamorin of Calicut. Although this battle actually proved inconclusive, the subsequent departure of the Ottoman fleet under the Egyptian Admiral Mir Hussein led to Portuguese naval supremacy in India. In the earlier battle off Cochin (1503), the Zamorin had superiority in naval strength but lacked an ocean-going navy and was, therefore, unable to destroy the enemy fleet. Thus, without any decisive battle, the supremacy of the sea passed to the Portuguese. In effect, the battle off Cochin and the engagement off Diu are the most significant events in Indian maritime history.

Dominance over the Indian Ocean subsequently passed to the British, with the departure of the French de Suffren from India (1783) and Nelson’s victory at Trafalgar (1805). The Mughals remained blissfully unaware of the importance of sea-power to the empire. Consequently, India’s maritime, and what existed of its naval, capabilities were in no position to prevent subjugation by the British. It was clear that the British would control the Indian Ocean through the Royal Navy. There was no requirement for an indigenous Indian navy in this scheme of things till the late 1920s when Admiral Katari entered the training ship Dufferin. However, the neglect of naval-power development persisted, partly due to the focus on land oriented warfare in an adversarial neighbourhood with a predominance of land forces and the consequent absence of a naval threat. This was borne out by subsequent events.

In short, Indian security considerations continue to be dominated by developments on land with maritime affairs being perceived merely as an extension of these activities. Although there were notable exceptions such as the intrusion of the nuclear-armed U S aircraft carrier-led task force into the Bay of Bengal during the 1971 war, they remained just that—exceptions to the rule.

Time has come for us to appreciate the challenges to our maritime security. Maritime security issues are of both a military and a non-military nature. It is, therefore, necessary to take both these components into account for a proper understanding of their collective impact on national security. In this context, ports, shipping and imports of energy resources, for example, should be seen as critical dimensions of maritime security.

In the emerging security environment, India’s dependence on the sea will increase in terms of trade, energy resources, shipping, sustainable exploitation of marine resources and ocean research and exploration. Its transportation routes will be increasingly vulnerable to disruption and a range of criminal and clandestine activities. The continuing militarisation of the Indian Ocean and the dynamic role of technology on naval warfare will also impact upon the country. It is imperative, therefore, that maritime security issues are perceived in a holistic, not a compartmentalised, manner.

The geo-political environment in our immediate neighbourhood of the Indian Ocean is currently in a state of high tension and increased naval and military-related activity. This follows the tragedy of the September 11 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington. In the last few days we have seen, on our television screens, the arrival of American, British and other warhips from countries far and wide. They have travelled through the Suez Canal on our west and the Straits of Malacca and Singapore in our east, to deploy in the Arabian Sea.

The presence of these warships to fight against the forces of terrorism in a landlocked state hundreds of miles from the coast, points to the very essence of maritime power - the flexibility, mobility and reach of lethally armed and equipped naval forces. In modern day warfare, these forces provide the US and its allies the capability to carry out relatively accurate military strikes in a sustainable, and if required, variable manner. In the absence of actual naval and military operations, the very presence of these forces sends a strong and unambiguous message to their adversaries. They serve as an important lesson to us in terms of the potential, efficacy and multipurpose nature of naval power. Some countries in our neighbourhood also have ambitions in the Indian Ocean.

Over the years, the Indian Navy has developed into a multi-dimensional force with lethal weaponry and sensors, and enhanced reach. It has encouraged indigenisation of technology and production. Its modernisation continues to keep pace with rapidly advancing technologies and doctrines of modern warfare. Three elements appear to be at the core of the Indian Navy’s doctrine - the development of rapid reaction manoeuvrability, along with the concentration of firepower; land-attack capability to influence the war on land and naval diplomacy.

The latter was most visible during the first International Fleet Review hosted by the Indian Navy last February which was attended by 24 warships from 19 countries. In addition, ten other countries sent senior naval representatives. Appropriately enough, it was called "Bridges of Friendship". Apart from this, it could be relevant here to recall the seizure of the Japanese-owned/Panamanian-registered freighter, the MV Alondra Rainbow, from pirates in the Arabian Sea in late 1999 by the Navy and the Coast Guard.

The naval battlefield environment is changing rapidly. The Information Age has spawned the ‘revolution in military affairs’ (RMA) which is producing new lethal weapon systems and facilitating the militarisation of outer space and cyber-related crime. The RMA, in turn, has spawned the ‘revolution in naval affairs’ (RNA) which has greatly enhanced night capabilities, yielded precision weapons and seamless communication networks, and considerably reduced response time for naval forces. Stealth technology remains critical. The Indian Navy will need to incorporate these aspects in its war-fighting doctrine.

India has to step up surveillance and protection of India’s vast coastline of 7,516 kms as well as its EEZ. Clandestine infiltration and arms drops by Pakistan take place on the Gujarat and Maharashtra coasts. The problems created by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) along the Tamil Nadu coast are well known. The Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal are also increasingly vulnerable to a range of criminal and clandestine activities. These include smuggling, arms and narcotics trafficking (hand maidens of terrorism), illegal fishery activities, piracy attacks, theft, fraud and other crimes and illegal activities at sea. Coastal security was one of the issues addressed by the Group of Ministers (GoM) in its report, Reforming the National Security System (2001). Its recommendations include the up- gradation of the Coast Guard and the establishment of specialised marine police in all coastal states and island territories. These are currently under implementation.

India’s thousand-plus island territories and rocks are largely uninhabited and lie at considerable distances from the mainland in proximity to other countries. The Andaman and Nicobar islands are particularly vulnerable to clandestine activities and illegal infiltration and occupation. Militancy in both Myanmar and Indonesia have an adverse impact on these islands.

Since 70% of our energy requirements of crude oil are currently shipped from abroad, increased focus would be required on the ability to maintain the safety and security of energy shipments and the prevention of any disruption of supply. Special attention would also need to be given to shipping in the Gulf of Cambay and Kutch. Also, as 19% of our oil demands are generated by offshore basins, the defence of maritime assets and infrastructure is critical. Protection of over 150 process and well platforms at sea, operating beyond the EEZ in the near future, would also be required.

Following the September 11 attacks, the possibility of maritime terrorism is of increasing concern. The hijacking of the passenger ship,the Achille Lauro, in 1988 brought terrorism at sea to the forefront of international condemnation and resulted in the Rome Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (1988). A terrorist attack on ships carrying dangerous and hazardous cargo such as a liquified natural gas (LNG) tanker, especially in port, would result in considerable human and material damage as well as environmental destruction over a wide area of land and sea. The LNG regasification terminals under construction/planned in India, as well as existing oil refineries and petrochemical complexes, are especially vulnerable to sabotage. The mining of narrow sea-lanes or approaches to ports will also remain a source of concern. Suicide missions on naval and maritime-related economic targets have taken place in neighbouring Sri Lanka.

Some of the major policy challenges to India’s maritime security include the surveillance and security of the extended maritime zone, an increase in domestic shipping tonnage, enhanced effectiveness of both major and minor ports and the strengthening of regulatory and enforcement mechanisms in India’s maritime zones.

India’s maritime zones, over which it has certain rights and obligations, include a territorial sea upto 12 nm (22 kms) from the baseline, a contiguous zone from 12 to 24 nm (22-44 kms), an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) from 12 to 200 nm (22-370 kms) and a continental shelf upto 200 nm, as well as upto 350 nm if certain conditions apply; the latter called the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS). These zones currently comprise 2.013 million sq km area of sea which is the 12th largest in the world and equivalent to two-thirds of the total land area. With the inclusion of the deep seabed mining area in the central Indian Ocean, lying only 370 kms from American naval and military facilities on Digo Garcia, and the formal delineation of the OCS by 2005, the total area of India’s maritime zones could well be equivalent to India’s total land area. In effect, this would provide India with sovereign rights over all non-living resources and sedimentary organisms within 650 kms from the coast, where applicable. This, indeed, is a vast "maritime space" and strategic space for India.

Over the years, India has successfully demarcated its maritime boundaries with Indonesia, Maldives, Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Thailand. However, maritime boundaries with Pakistan and Bangladesh remain to be demarcated. In addition to a military build-up by Pakistan in the Kutch/Sir Creek area, the potential exploitation of oil and gas in these waters, as well as offensive patrolling at sea, could exacerbate tensions. Harassment of Indian fishers takes place regularly.

In accordance with current trends, domestic shipping is not keeping pace with the increasing volume of crude oil imports with the result that the proportion of crude oil carried on Indian bottoms will go down further from the 50% level of the late 1990s. The share of foreign trade carried on Indian bottoms is also expected to decrease from the current 27-30%. Moreover, the Indian shipping fleet is ageing rapidly. We should address the issues arising from the impact of these three factors on our national security in times of uncertainty or hostility.

The inefficiency of ports, with low productivity and high traffic handling times, also has a negative impact upon the country’s economic growth and development. Whereas the Average Ship Turn Around (ASTA) time for container ships in ports such as Singapore is only 6-8 hours, it is as high as 3.74 days at the Jawaharlal Nehru Port, the country’s most modern port. In 1999-2000, India’s 11 major ports handled 272 MT of traffic, with a total capacity of only 258 MT. With globalisation and liberalisation, our exports are expected to increase considerably. This will necessitate additional port capacities to cater to the growing volume of exports and, indeed, of foreign trade.

The regulatory mechanisms in India’s maritime zones need to be strengthened by the enactment of new legislation and enforced by setting up mechanisms for implementation. This could include the promulgation of anti-piracy laws, legislation for the exploitation of mineral resources and the designation of Marine Protected Areas (MPA). Some of the other important policy challenges to maritime security include scientific research in Antarctica, the ability to deal with dual-use scientific data and products, the protection and sustainable utilisation of the marine environment and the prevention, and if necessary, quick response to pollution from land-based sources, shipping and oil slicks.

There is currently a fragmentation of organisations, policies and legal and enforcement measures relating to maritime security issues. This results in overlapping of jurisdiction and an inability to provide quick decisions or respond effectively to fast evolving situations. Currently, as many as 12 ministries and eight departments of the central government are involved in maritime-related policy formulation and implementation, as are nine coastal states and four Union Territories, with defence left to the Navy and the Coast Guard.

To deal with such a situation, a formal mechanism for coordination among the multiple users of the sea is urgently required. This would enable effective and time-urgent coordination among varied maritime related ministries/departments of the Government, as also the concerned states and Union Territories. In this respect, the Group of Ministers' report has recommended the formation of "an apex body for management of maritime affairs".

There should also be a concerted focus on maritime security in India’s diplomatic bilateral/multilateral relationships. This could take the form of a regular maritime security dialogue with countries of the Indian Ocean Rim (IOR) to ensure the stability of sea lanes of communication in the area which accounts for over half the world’s merchant fleet, by tonnage. Finally, there is a critical need to create awareness of maritime security in the country in terms of both education and research. A specialised documentation division for the much neglected study of Indian maritime history and naval warfare is also required.

Technological forces are directly impacting on international and regional security at a time when the world is still in transition from the cold war security order to a post-cold war security order. In the face of technological change at an unprecedented rate, the ability to keep pace with rapid change may distinguish the successful cultures from the not-so-successful cultures. In the last five decades, the world has amassed more scientific knowledge than was generated in the previous 5,000 years. The most swift advances in technology, however, have been occurring since the late 1980s with the advent of the Information Age, with scientific information now increasing two-fold about every five years. It is imperative for us to stay abreast with technological developments to safeguard our security and decision-making autonomy. Particular attention needs to be paid to the maritime dimensions of national security as they are linked to India’s political stability and economic prosperity. To maximise our interests at sea and to effectively manage the fast-paced technological developments, we need to formulate a sophisticated proactive multi-pronged, long-term strategy.