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Kargil
operations and certain other events on our borders have
brought to the fore, the need for a strategic change in our
thinking to tackle the problems of a limited war which can
have high stakes in the political field and our stability
quotient. The borders are not invincible, thanks to the many
scientific innovations which every modern army is procuring
for their field soldiers. While our operation-preparedness has
to cater for a major conflict in the sub-continent, there is
also a need to keep sufficient tactical forces that can be
deployed at short notices to react in any portion of our
sensitive borders. Strategic intelligence combined with
skilled field work should always be able to anticipate and
help to prevent any major physical intrusion.
The absolute necessity
of orchestrating modern air-power and artillery support fire
as the adjunct to the infantry man was duly felt during the
Kargil operations. As the Indian Army and the Air Force obtain
upgraded weapons, the group cohesion in the display of fire
power cannot be overemphasised. The basic infantry arm itself
has to refine its tactical role using more sophisticated
weapons such as flame throwers, tank destroyers and night
illuminating devices.
With the wide range of
territorial configuration in our country, the Army has to face
deployment and operations starting from the bare deserts of
Rajasthan to the heights of Siachen and the inhospitable
jungles of the North-East. Training for high altitude
operations, counter-insurgency warfare and desert operations
requires that the tactical skill be sharpened
with emphasis on innovation, improvisation and ingenuity. The
Indian Army has enough expertise to develop battlefield
tactics which will enable the fighting forces to cater for all
kinds of weather, terrain and environmental conditions. The
field formations have to be prepared for the skills of modern
nuclear war even though we may not be the proponents of first
use as declared by the Government. The fighting soldier has to
pivot himself for a combination of warfare under both
conventional and nuclear warfare conditions.
On the issue of
logistics, it is again evident that the conventional siting of
base depots and maintenance areas will not be able to cope up
with the wide challenges that are posed both on the Indo-Pak
border and in the disturbed areas of the North-East. The
logistics chain, based on perspective planning, got toppled
during the Kargil operations when even the mainline of
communication was almost cut off by enemy intrusions. The
Government is now taking active steps to galvanise our
strategic roads in the border areas and improve infrastructure
such as petroleum installations, pipelines and other
communication network. However, the vital requirement of
logistics necessitates that the entire Army chain of
administrative installations are wired through information
technology systems which will provide real time data at all
levels of command and logistics supply chain channels.
Some military experts
are of the view that a continuous deployment for
counter-insurgency and the increased allotment of defended
sectors on the ground have slowly negated the principles of
rotation and have milked peace-time unit resources. In the
present scenario, there is bound to be no let-up in the
requirement of ground troops and their presence in many areas
of counter-insurgency. If we wish to maintain the morale of
the fighting arms, it is necessary that we have a serious look
at the concept of using the Territorial Army for deployment in
rear areas and less threatened sectors. The budget itself is
groaning under the weight of pay and pensions which form
almost fiftyfive per cent of the annual expenditure. A
national policy on the terms of a soldier and post-retirement
benefits have to be evolved if we are not to collapse by sheer
manpower cost. The alarming shortage of officers can only be
tackled if we accept a graded increase in the intake of
officers, specially the short-term service candidates for whom
additional training infrastructure can be created at some of
the training centres. The supporting services would, on the
other hand, have to accept greater quota of intake from those
who are selected from the lower ranks to the Army Cadet
College or a channel of special list officers.
In peace time, the Army's requirements
of accommodation, travel and logistics need more attention for
which the Government has to constitute additional allocation
through the ministries of Railways and Urban Development. Most
of the soldiers are unable to avail of married accommodation
facility as they are constantly being churned for
counter-insurgency aid to civil power and during natural
calamities. It would be worthwhile if accommodation for the
entitled soldier is provided at any military station whether
he is in an operational area or not.
-Brig A
Thyagarajan (Retd)
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